This article examines the evolution of the EU 'redistributive' policies in the (post-) crisis EU era. By reviewing the EU cohesion policy, the financial assistance mechanisms, the new economic governance measures and the potentials of attributing the EU fiscal capacity, it aims to conceptualize the notion of solidarity as redistribution as this has evolved by reason of the crisis. The article argues that by virtue of the diverging economies, interests and preferences of the Member States, reciprocal or 'effects-based solidarity' is the only type of solidarity that has been exhibited among the Member States during the crisis. It, further, shows how the principle of solidarity has not lived up to its potential in the present crisis context, but it has instead been cropped up in sharply different ways in the rhetorics and communications of political parties of all hues across the Union.
Introduction
There has been a lot of debate recently as to whether the EU has exhibited a spirit of solidarity during the crisis. The answer, I believe, depends on two variables; first, on how one defines solidarity, and secondly, whether there was/is room from a realistic and legal perspective to be solidary on a transnational level.
This article sets out up by providing an overview of the concept of solidarity and its evolution. It argues that by reason of the crisis the economic and social differences among the Member States have been exacerbated. This has further deepened the division between national or social and transnational or inter-state solidarity and has impacted on the decisions and choices of the Member States with regard to the national and the EU budget(s). In times when national budgets are shrinking it is more likely that the remaining funds will be used for national purposes, instead of transnational aid. This contribution will argue that by virtue of the increasing division, 'transnational solidarity' is to be discerned as a reciprocal or 'negative' concept. To bring that point home, I will explore the areas that pertain to the 'redistributive' character of solidarity; the EU cohesion policy, the financial assistance mechanisms, the new EU economic governance measures and the potential that the EU acquires fiscal capacity.
The article, hence, proceeds by delimiting the notion of solidarity for its purposes, into solidarity as redistribution. Upon reviewing the main redistributive policy in the EU, the EU Cohesion policy as it materializes through the EU Funds, I will turn to examine the new economic governance measures of the EU in order to investigate whether the 'EU redistributive' framework has been solidary and what type of solidarity it has been premised upon.
The concepts of solidarity
The concept of solidarity has been enshrined in the Treaties and has regularly been used under different Titles as a fundamental guiding principle, in particular when crises occur. I In this 'crisis' context, the legislator has perceived solidarity as a 'positive' or altruistic concept which does not merely exist by reason of factual interdependence among depends on a 'quid pro quo' interaction which can be discerned both at the national and supranational level. The trade-offs required for the redistributive state to perform, entail, in most cases, the choice among different levels and quality of supply of public (or quasi public) goods, different taxation systems and rates and different state intervention levels.
These decisions usually take place at the national level and they are shaped in accordance with each state's traditions, culture and preferences, represented at a higher level by the elected governments. This way these choices enjoy democratic legitimacy. Naturally, these national preferences and benchmarks are then, transposed to the EU level, creating different expectations and different dispositions towards the associated 'trade-offs' among people who are united by a certain degree of economic integration, but not by any sense of demos or identity.
It is, in principle, the EU who has to bridge these different dispositions via harmonization or regulation. The situation is similar at the EU level, where choices have to be made both with regard to the objectives of the redistribution, the share each of the partners contributes, the anticipated results and the potential gains for all the participants.
At this redistribution level the EU is, thus, called to perform some sort of cost benefit analysis while respecting and allocating -to the extent possible -the different political, economic and social backgrounds of the Member States.
The witnessing of the deterioration of social benefits and services-in particular in the financially assisted Member States, and the increase of the economic, social and political disparities among the Member States by reason of the crisis made more skeptical the people of the Union with regard to the EU's room and willingness to act against the crisis.
The 'bail out' mechanisms that prevented the default of some countries and the state aids that halted the bankruptcy of major banks could be perceived more as an effort to save the Eurozone and the huge economic interests involved, rather than as an attempt to alleviate the burden from the socially disadvantaged. Similarly, the dire economic situation and the shrinking budgets of most Member States were calling for swift decisions with regard to solidarity; solidarity within the state and towards each state's own nationals, or transnational solidarity that would help keep the EU construct together? The perception of the peoples of Europe would play a key role in this dilemma, as the democratically elected governments would, at least in theory, be called to apply policy choices for and from the people (input and output legitimacy). However, despite the intergovernmental character of the new economic governance measures, democratically deliberative decision-making remained absent in the process of their adoption. With or without democratic legitimation, in view of this economic situation, the increasing divide between the Member States and the growing uncertainty about the future, the solidarity to be 'provided' would, inevitably, be limited and could not any more function in its altruistic understanding but had to come with guarantees, safeguards and mutual returns for all participants (Giubboni 2010). 
Solidarity as redistribution: Altruism versus Reciprocity
In most scholarly literature solidarity is deeply connected to redistribution and, in turn, to distributive justice. Should there be redistribution, what purposes should it serve and should it be connected to moral assessments are only a few questions that pertain to the concept of solidarity.
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In EU law solidarity has been perceived as a legal concept. Already in the TEC the Communities intended to promote inter alia economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States (Article 2 TEC). The instutionalization of solidarity which has underpinned the EU integration project since its very beginnings has historically served to bridge 'social conflicts and redistributing resources in accordance with the normative assumptions that are implicit in a polity ' (de Witte 2012: 704) . Solidarity has, thus, been associated (both at national and supranational level) not only with the concept of redistribution which constitutes the means to achieve it, but also with the concept of social justice (the purpose or the normative assumption), including the promotion of social rights, labour and employment rights, fundamental rights and related policy areas that derive from a welfare state. But in the 'quid pro quo' trade-off between market principles and social objectives, the Court of Justice has repeatedly given priority to economic integration and market(s)' liberalization while ignoring the 'social state'. VII This finding cannot be disassociated from the fact that it has been the economic freedoms and the competition law provisions in the Treaties that constituted the motor of the European integration throughout the years. While the Member States agreed to a transfer of powers with respect to the aforementioned economic policy areas to the EU, powers relating to the social sphere and the welfare state remained at nation-state level, where it was believed they could be better addressed. As social policies remained decoupled from the 'economic' European 'a relationship that is motivated to some extent by each of these powerful motives, but
[remains] irreducible to either one of them' (Viehoff and Nicolaidis 2015) .
Understanding solidarity as redistribution and accepting the idea that this concept need not necessarily encompass any altruistic or empathetic elements is crucial in order to evaluate whether the EU response in the current crisis has exhibited a spirit of solidarity, as termed for the purposes of this contribution. If one, however, disassociates solidarity from any motives and moral assessments, solidarity will be assessed only by reason of its effects to distributive justice and the welfare state.
As the following parts aim to highlight, in the EU redistribution context there is no pure altruism. In the best case scenario one can place solidarity in the 'solidarity compass' at the intersection of the aforementioned continuums. This, however, does not mean that solidarity is absent altogether in the (post-) crisis legal framework. By contrast, as the EU cohesion policy and the new economic governance measures' analyses will show, it exists partly by virtue of its effects and processes rather than by reason of the intentions behind it.
At present, redistribution is divided in the EU. Similar to direct taxation, redistribution is entrusted, to a large part, to the Member States -in agreement with the fiscal federalism theory. It is the Member States, in principle, that decide how they will allocate their revenues, how they will form their budget and to what degree they will opt for a 'social' and welfare state model. In accord with that, the main instrument for redistribution, taxation, is almost entirely reserved for the Member States. In an effort, however, to balance the uneven distributive impact of Europeanisation the EU has obtained an institutionalized and constitutionalized redistributive role which is fulfilled by virtue of the EU budget and the EU cohesion policy (EU funds) and through regulation both at EU and national level.
The EU Cohesion Policy
The EU Cohesion policy is dedicated to bridging the discrepancies among the various and it currently figures as a major cornerstone in the 'Europe 2020' strategy. After the numerous and complex reforms it has undergone, since its first appearance in the mid1970s, the EU Cohesion policy, which is effectuated through the EU Funds, currently accounts for a large part of the EU budget at EUR 351.8 billion for the period 2014-2020.
Consequently, a large part of the EU budget is being spent on effectuating the EU cohesion policy into the major redistribution policy instrument in the EU.
The EU cohesion policy has an important place in EU philosophy and is governed by the 'redistributive idea' which stems from the intuitively reasonable assumption that the 'less favoured' regions are in need of 'EU funding' in order to be able to compete in the common market against the more favoured ones. XIII This idea of the 'subsidization' by the beneficiaries of European integration and regulatory competition seems to match partly, Maduro's idea of being solidary 'by establishing a link between the wealth generated by European integration and the requirement to distribute it fairly' and seems to confirm the idea that solidarity in EU law should be discerned as a 'reciprocal' concept (Maduro 2012:
6). As a redistributive idea, the EU cohesion policy is intrinsically linked to the development of the EU budget.
The, by comparison, small amounts destined to reduce the regional economic and social disparities among the Member States and their regions are per se a problem in the realization of this goal. The unwillingness of many Member States to contribute to this redistributive policy is the second obstacle in this process. As the role of cohesion policy is to bring closer the richer and poorer parts of the EU, it is inevitable that the EU budget allocations would not be unanimously endorsed. National interests in the amounts and the allocations involved are divided, with the 'traditional net payers' or, in other words, the 'richer' Member States opposing more spending and the traditional 'beneficiaries' or the poorer States aiming for even more financing to compete with the richer ones on equal grounds (Bachtler et al. 2013) . XIV This opposition to a larger EU budget for redistributive purposes has been exacerbated as a result of the crisis. The 'profligate south', a habitual recipient of EU Funds, being in a dire economic situation, inevitably asks for more money, whereas the 'prudent north', the main financier of both the EU funds and the EU financial assistance has been more hesitant to disburse funds merely for benevolent reasons established on mutual trust and the need for a more coherent Europe.
On the same reciprocal basis, the political bargaining, inherent in the decision-making procedure that leads to the adoption of the EU budget has been extended also in the 'greatest redistributive' representative policies of all, the EU cohesion policy. Many
Member 'north' versus 'south' divide is conspicuous also in this respect; Southern countries tend to 'centralize' the decision making, whereas the northern countries are more apt to the involvement of other actors in the decision making process. This, certainly, has an impact on all levels of the implementation process, from the priorities and the goals to be served, to the project-selection process. Likewise, the different corruption levels at various Member States influence the EU funds' allocations. While examples of mismanagement, fraud and EU money waste are not to be found only in 'southern' countries, it is mostly the countries with the highest corruption perception index (CPI) that either fail to carry out the projects they were funded for, or prove to have invested the money in poor 'value for money' projects.
The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Court of Auditors (ECA) provide ample data that bespeak the EU Funds' amenability to abuse and fraud. During the annual audit the ECA carried out for 2013, it found with regard to the regularity of the transactions underlying the EU accounts, that while both revenue and financial commitments for 2013 were regular, the estimated error rate for 2013 payments was 4.7%, remaining persistently higher than the "materiality threshold" of 2%. (ECA 2014a) Errors arise when payments from the EU budget 'are neither legal nor regular, for example when claimed by ineligible beneficiaries, for expenditure that should not be financed by the EU, or when the conditions for receiving the aid are not followed.' (ECA 2014c) Thus, for a payment to be classified as 'error' it has to be contrary to the law and have a potentially harmful impact on the EU's financial interests.
Typical sources of error, besides compliance with eligibility criteria, include serious breaches of public procurement rules either deliberately, in order to favour certain 
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In a complete economic Union where the EU would be granted tax raising powers, redistribution could further be attained through taxation and in the post-crisis framework redistribution can be attained through the financial assistance mechanisms such as the ESM and the EFSF.
The first hybrid indirect redistributions in the face of the crisis
The EU budget constitutes the main form of redistribution in the EU. In lack of an EU fiscal capacity, whereby redistribution would depend largely on the revenues arising from taxation, redistribution via the EU budget is currently effectuated through regulation, 
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Facility (EFSF). These indirect redistributions were not effectuated directly via the EU budget, but instead they constituted some form of fiscal transfers among the Member
States. These transfers have temporarily -at least -contributed to the rescue of certain Member States in need and have, thus, exhibited a spirit of assistance in that each euro area Member State has participated with its capital to the ESM.
But are these two elements sufficient to mitigate the 'negative' solidarity caveats the financial assistance mechanisms entail; First of all the conditionalities attached to all the financial assistance programmes and secondly the ulterior motives behind their granting. It has been argued that the institutionalization of these financial assistance mechanisms, which was culminated with the establishment of the permanent ESM, marked the transition from 'negative' to 'positive' solidarity and demarcated a new era for 'normative' solidarity (Borger 2013). This 'crisis-induced' shift can be illustrated, according to Borger, via the 'departure from an economic policy that is predominantly focused on budgetary prudence and price stability to one that takes better into account financial stability as well.'
The broad interpretation of the 'no-bail out' clause by the CJEU in the Pringle case, XX and the authorization the CJEU gave the ECB for bond-buying in the secondary markets XXI point indeed towards a more 'altruistic' version of solidarity, one that aspires to the common good.
While, indeed, both from an ex post factual assessment, as well as from a strictly legal perspective, the financial assistance that allowed some Member States not to default cannot be overlooked, XXII the motives and the conditions attached to this financial assistance are not, in my view, capable of altering the reciprocal character of solidarity into an altruistic or positive one (Hilpold 2014). With regard to the ulterior motives behind the granting of financial assistance, as the press at that time argued, the granting of assistance aspired to the saving of the Eurozone as a whole, given the possible domino effects the default of one Eurozone country could cause to the other Eurozone members. This finding is further reinforced by the fact that the response to the two alleged causes of the crisis, the EU's structural problem of a single currency union without a fiscal union, in other words the EU being a non-optimal currency area, and the fiscal profligacy of the Member States resulting from the unenforceability of the Stability and Growth Pact, was initially focused on enhancing fiscal surveillance and fiscal discipline in the EU.
Despite many political assertions that one of the driving powers behind the strengthening of stability, unity, and integrity of the euro area was solidarity, Draghi's speech in July 2012 who reassured the markets that "the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough" revealed the true motives behind the 'solidary character' the EU and the Member States had demonstrated recently.
Certainly, one could not expect much more from an independent institution entrusted with conducting the monetary policy of the Union (Article 282 TFEU).
However, it soon became clear that the use of the 'solidarity rhetorics' in various political statements, both at national and supranational level, was not sufficient to upgrade the solidarity principle into a critical principle in the crisis resolution nor to attribute it a 'positive' or altruistic meaning. As such, despite solidarity being a legal concept in EU law and a long-standing principle in the process of the European integration, it has not unfolded to lead to in concreto solutions in the present crisis. Similarly, the very strict conditionalities attached to the provision of financial assistance are, certainly, not sufficient to cancel out the financial assistance's redistributive character but could prove adequate to refute the financial assistance's 'positive solidary' character.
They instead, simply, ascribe a different feature to the notion of solidarity, that of a reciprocal disposition, or rather a 'solidarity of fact'. The conditionalities the bailout programmes entail, for instance, fail to promote social solidarity as they impinge upon the social policies of the Member States and they often require introducing detrimental to the welfare state measures. XXIII They, hence, aim at ensuring that the benefited States will comply with the 'budgetary discipline' attached to the assistance and that moral hazard will be avoided rather than guaranteeing that the citizens of the assisted states will enjoy a higher degree of welfare at no additional cost.
The 'supranational regulation' of national budgetary policies: a new window of opportunity?
The While the history of European integration, the crisis legal framework as well as the case law of the CJEU point towards a market-oriented approach, the dire economic and, often, humanitarian situation of many Member States has pushed the EU decision-makers to review the impact of the new economic governance measures on the social policies.
According to the 'five presidents''' report 'employment and social concerns must feature highly in the European Semester. Unemployment, especially long term unemployment, is one of the main reasons for inequality and social exclusion.' In order to promote more 'social cohesion' and 'social justice' the European Commission can commence from promoting through its interference in the national budgets more 'socially' or 'solidary' (in its social sense) policies. Such a venture could be achieved, for instance, by taking social imbalances into account when assessing convergence and imbalances (Notre Europe Policy Paper), or by 'coercing' the Member States to apply social redistributive measures, such as progressive taxation, or wealth taxes or special levies on luxury goods, instead of increasing taxes related to labour. Through this 'backdoor' intrusion, the EU as a whole can for the first time influence the 'hard core' national policies towards a more 'social justice' oriented goal.
The 'potential': Attributing the EU a fiscal capacity?
By reason of the fact that the EU is not a federal state, it is caught in the paradoxical situation where it has little fiscal capacity but regulates the fiscal conduct of the member states (Hallerberg 2014).
The recent discussions on the possibility of attributing the EU fiscal capacity, in other words, giving the EU the power to raise taxes, in order to create a 'federal budget' that could be used as a 'crisis-buffer' are stretching the EU's competences and challenge its creativity in finding new ways to overcome constitutional and institutional problems.
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The primary advantage of granting the EU fiscal capacity would be the increase of the EU budget. The second big advantage is that the transfer of tax raising powers to the EU, provided it is democratically legitimized, would 'democratize' also the EU's spending powers.
The Van Rompuy report recommended that the central level of the euro area should be equipped with powers for common decision-making on national budgets or else be given a fiscal capacity of its own. XXVII By analogy with the existing minimal EU budget, a fiscal capacity could be funded from contributions of member states in relation to their economic output, or via a fixed share of national taxes (e.g. value-added tax), or a common 
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The Commission's discussion on the fiscal capacity of the EMU, suggesting, among other solutions, a Treaty amendment to include a legal basis attributing tax raising powers to the EU seems highly unlikely in view of the unanimity required under the ordinary legislative procedure in order to proceed to such a conferral of a new competence. Another suggestion advances the ECB as the optimal solution, an institution which certainly does not meet the democratic legitimacy criterion, or a new institution to be created within the Euro group that would fulfil the political legitimacy and accountability criteria (Vanistendael 2010).
Regardless of the potentials of such tremendous institutional and constitutional changes, the fact that at a political level such ambitious projects of centralisation are being contemplated demonstrates the change in the perception and the mentality of the EU executives that are trying to find ways to build a 'fiscal Union' as a complement of the EU and as an antidote to the current and future crises. If this undertaking is implemented and on condition that it meets the necessary legality and legitimacy criteria, it will provide the first opportunity for the EU citizens
Conclusion
The answer to the question whether the EU, faced with the recent unprecedented crisis has demonstrated a solidary spirit, depends on one's understanding of the concept of solidarity. As the analysis of the EU 'redistribution framework' showed even in the 'most redistributive policy of all', the EU Cohesion policy, political conflicts and bargaining show that there is no room for purely altruistic motives and transfers completely detached from self-interest or Member States' interdependencies. For this it is not only the Member States to be denounced. Instead, this 'negative' or 'reciprocal' solidarity is inherent in the EU by reason of the huge differences among the Member States and the lack of a common demos and ethos among the EU people. The different interests, performances and preferences displayed by the participating Member States at the EU cohesion, the financial assistance and the new economic governance branches are telling of the unfavorable environment within which a positive or altruistic solidarity was expected to flourish. Despite the lack of these normative elements, the invention by the EU of new mechanisms to redistribute money and to better monitor the budgets of the Member States proves that inter-state solidarity in its reciprocal or 'effects-based' form was exhibited at an inter-state level.
While social justice and 'social solidarity' were not the main drive behind the financial assistance measures, a window of opportunity has opened to the EU to promote its social values through its increasing interference in the budgets of the Member States as stipulated in the Six Pack and the European Semester. Despite the democratic legitimization deficit this competences' expansion entails, this opportunity, if utilized accordingly by the Commission, could allow the EU to finally assume an active role towards a 'bottom-up' approach for an 'EU social policy'.
The lesson from the EU response to the crisis is not only that solidarity, at least in what concerns the EU 'redistributive' policies, cannot be understood as an altruistic or positive concept, but also, rather gloomily, that it seems completely deprived of its legal value. The fact that (transnational) solidarity is not considered among the main driving principles behind the recently adopted measures as a response to the crisis, but it has instead cropped up in sharply different ways in the rhetorics and communications of political parties of all hues across the Union is demonstrative of the malleability of the principle as well as the self-interest motives that underpin it.
XXXIII
Against the hybrid but effective redistributive mechanisms created by reason of the crisis, the road towards a fiscal Union that would allow the EU to raise taxes and operate a federal budget seems long and the prospects of an EU fiscal federation appear bleak. Such an undertaking would require, in addition to the revision of the current legal framework, an increased democratic legitimacy that could only be provided if the people of Europe were united by a common identity.
In lack of other effective redistributive means in the EU, the better management of the EU budget should be put in the spotlight. In this respect, in order for optimal redistribution to be achieved and social and economic cohesion to be attained, a revision and simplification of the current very complex multi-level governance structure of the EU Funds is needed and better monitoring and sanctioning on behalf of the EU is required. Nozick (1974) to Rawls (1971) . XII The idea of a Reciprocity Based Internationalism (RBI) was developed by A. Sangiovanni, as an idea best expressing EU solidarity at present. According to this concept, 'demands for social solidarity at all levels of governance can be understood as demands for a fair return in the mutual production of important collective goods' (Sangiovanni 2013). XIII Note, however, the 'neoliberal' objection, according to which the EU cohesion policy's objective is to create an internal market insulated from political and governmental interferences. In this respect, cohesion policy has more an allocative rather than a distributive function, whereby it aims to stimulate growth and competitiveness in the market by increasing GDP per head rather than redistributing income to poorer regions. For this argument, see Marks 1996: 391. XIV For the division between 'net payers' and 'net beneficiaries' see for instance, European Commission, 'Cohesion Policy 2007 -2013 : Commentaries and Official Texts' (2007 
